The psychological overtones of this letter do not need to be emphasized. Bolivar dreams of two victories in Peru like those won in Venezuela and New Granada; he is not willing to gamble away his glory, and he wants to appear before San Martin as the Chosen Son. Shortly afterward, when he again addresses himself to San Martin, his desire for glory is veiled under a cloud of incense, but may still be noted when he writes that, after the welfare of Colombia, nothing concerns him so much as the success of San Martin's arms. He reiterates his desire to meet the Argentine, and he adds: "Quiera el cielo que los servicios del ej6rcito colombiano no sean necesarios a los pueblos del Peru."'6 Even as early as this, Bolivar had a premonition that both his services and those of the Colombian army might be required to complete Peruvian independence, but he preferred to clothe his apprehension in the diplomatic form of a wish that San Martin might be able to finish the job alone. Meanwhile, he dispatched one of his confidants, Colonel Diego Ybarra, to San Martin as officer de liaison and he suggested that the Chilean-Peruvian fleet should go to Panama to help in the final assault on Ecuador.'7 There 193 can be no doubt that San Martin's triumph spurred the Liberator to complete the emancipation of the continent."8 As Bolivar moved southward, practical considerations became daily more urgent, and the friendship, which so far had been merely theoretical, developed into a closer working relationship. The international situation-the danger of a reactionary victory in Mexico-forced Bolivar to appeal for military help, and he asked San Martin to send one battalion, composed of Colombians who were fighting under Argentine command, to Guayaquil."9 Although San Martin was ready to accede to Bolivar's request, it was precisely the question of Guayaquil that produced the first embarrassment and tension between these two leaders of the independence movement.
When news of San Martin's landing in Peru in September of 1820 reached Guayaquil, the port had risen in rebellion against Spain. Bolivar had been quick to take advantage of this patriotic move to foster his own designs. In a statute of the republic of Colombia issued in 1819 by the Congress of Angostura, the department of Quito had been included in the boundaries of the new state.20 Bolivar now hastened to advance claims to Guayaquil, the title to which he considered to be in harmony with the principles of international law professed by the revolution.21 He promised the government of the city of Guayaquil his support, and sent Sucre to take care of the situation. His intention was to make Guayaquil the spring board of his campaign against the Spaniards in Ecuador, and he was, therefore, doubly interested in the fate of this vital stronghold on the Pacific.
Sucre's mission, however, met with obstacles which Bolivar could not easily have foreseen. Not only did the royalists hamper Sucre's activities, but the city government itself presented a fresh problem by declaring its desire for complete independence.22 At the same time, San Martin's regard for the port had been quickened, and he hoped to incorporate it in the territory of Peru under his protectorate. Each of the three factions: that favoring independence, the group supporting the Colombian claims, and the one which preferred annexation to Peru, had its supporters among the inhabitants. San Martin took the opportunity to send two of his co-workers to spread propaganda in the interest Is Cartas, II, 392. The fate of the port had thus become a bone of contention between the two liberators. At the end of the year 1821, the Colombian forces were more in need of support than was San Martin. Sucre, in his attempt to reach Quito, had suffered a severe reverse at Ambato in the autumn of 1821, and he approached San Martin with an appeal for military help, for the lack of which the whole of Ecuador might be lost.
San Martin consented to send an auxiliary division under the command of Colonel Andres Santa Cruz, but an agreement was drawn up by which it was provided that Colombia would pay the expenses of the division and would also replace any casualties it might suffer. The so-called division Santa Cruz was composed of 1200 men, and the part it played in the campaign of 1822 became an important issue at the meeting of the two men.24 In the meantime, although Bolivar certainly welcomed this military aid, he remained adamant on the question of Guayaquil. On January 2, 1822, he wrote to the government of Guayaquil: "Colombia no permitird jamas que ninguna poder de America enzete su territorio."25 San Martin deeply resented Bolivar's attitude, and ordered Santa Cruz' contingent to return to Peruvian territory, using as a pretext a royalist threat against Lima. At the same time, he addressed Bolivar in a dignified but severe tone, stating that the destiny of border territories should be determined by the voluntary vote of the inhabitants. "Dejemos que Guayaquil consulte su destino y medite sus intereses para agregarse libremente a la secci6n que le convenga."26 In Lima, even the possibility of declaring war against Colombia was entertained for a short time, although caution finally prevailed. Bolivar, on the other hand, decided on a policy of resolution and audacity. He wrote San Martin: Yo no pienso como V. E. que el voto de una provincia debe ser consultado para constituir la soberania nacional porque no son las parties 23Documentos sino el todo del pueblo el que delibera en las asambleas generates reunidas libre y legitimamente.27 He drew a sombre picture of the anarchy prevailing in Guayaquil. However, although he did not promise a plebiscite, he consented to ask for the general opinion in the port. "No es el interest de una pequefia provincia lo que puede turbar la marcha majestuosa de America meridional." 28 In point of fact, the interests of a small province had not deferred the majestic steps of the independence movement. Sucre had persuaded Santa Cruz to disregard San Martin's orders, and the Peruvian division had remained in Ecuador. In May of 1822 it had made a contribution to the final victory at Pichincha. Bolfvar's military and political situation was fundamentally changed by the conquest of Ecuador.
Some days after Bolivar's triumphal march into Quito he again addressed the Protector in a formal expression of gratitude for the services rendered by the Peruvian forces. He promised to give equal or greater help to San Martin in his endeavor to expel the Spaniards from American soil.
Tengo la mayor satisfaction en anunciar a V. E. que la guerra de Colombia esta terminada, que su ejercito esta pronto para marchar donde quiera que sus hermanos lo llamen, y muy particularmente a la patria de nuestros vecinos del Sur.29
Bolivar was not unmindful of the part played by the division Santa Cruz, and he bestowed high honors on the commander and his men. He ordered the promised replacement of casualties suffered by Santa Cruz, taking war prisoners for this purpose as was commonly done at that time. Bolivar took care that it should not be said he was less generous than his neighbors.A0 But Bolivar's gesture was merely a point of honor, and did not for a moment signify that his political plans had been altered; on the contrary. After pondering the issue for some days, he decided to forge ahead and bring about the annexation of Guayaquil. He relied on the legality of Colombia's claims, and also on the attitude of the population, which he believed was veering toward Colombia after the victory at Pichincha, but he did not hesitate to take advantage of his military superiority. He dered the triumphant army of Pichincha to march to Guayaquil, and on July 11, with his guard close at his heels, he entered the city himself.3' Since he had been apprehensive lest the Peruvian division might anticipate his move, he had delayed and diverted its march, and now, in order to avoid a possible clash between his own men, the Peruvian division, and the population of Guayaquil, he sent Santa Cruz to a small island, La Puna, at the mouth of the Guayaquil river, there to wait until the time of his departure for Peru.32 Thus, Bolivar had taken a practically unassailable position and could await San Martin's next move in tranquillity since he knew that their meeting was about to take place. We have already noted the firm tone he had adopted when he acquainted San Martin of his decision to take possession of Guayaquil, but he had also made it clear that he desired to meet the Protector of Peru. On June 22, 1822, he wrote San Martin, "La entrevista que V.E. se ha servido ofrecerme yo la deseo con mortal impaciencia, y la espero con tanta seguridad, como ofrecida por V.E."33 It seems logical to pause at this point and to consider just what San Martin expected from a meeting with Bolivar. In my opinion, San Martin, previous to 1821, anticipated nothing more from a meeting with Bolivar than the opportunity of making the acquaintance of an important contemporary who was striving for aims similar to his own. Before 1821 he would not have given political and military significance to, nor expected important consequences to be derived from, any personal contact with Bolivar. However, when he became Protector of Peru and when Lima and El Callao were occupied by his army in September of 1821, he faced a different situation. He had not been able to destroy Spanish power in Peru, nor had he been able to accelerate operations toward a speedy termination of the war. The Spanish viceroy maintained his stronghold in the Peruvian sierra and was able to concentrate an army numerically superior to that of the Independents. On the other hand, Bolivar's move toward Ecuadorwell under way by the fall of 1821-had brought the two revolutionary movements within reach of each other. 
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The situation confronting San Martin forced him into a contingent and expectant attitude. Since his own forces did not seem strong enough to destroy the royalist power, he decided to approach the Guayaquil problem from a diplomatic angle and to support Bolivar's conquest of Ecuador. It seems apparent that he pinned his hopes on a future combination of operations with the Colombian army. A meeting with Bolivar would offer him the opportunity of discussing the problems pending between the two power blocs and of coming to some agreement on a plan of action. In August of 1821, therefore, he had ordered from the northern province of Trujillo the drafting of the Santa Cruz division.35 Time was an important element in San Martin's game, but, as far as Peru was concerned, he found himself reduced to a state of military passivity, and the lack of action did not fail to undermine his prestige with the public and his authority with the army. The army's position was indeed abnormal; it had come to Peru as an army of liberation, but circumstances had very nearly converted it into an army of occupation. Composed of four heterogeneous national elements-Argentine, Chilean, Peruvian, and Colombian-with an additional sprinkling of European officers, it could hardly enjoy much stability. Moreover, San Martin's misunderstanding with Lord Cochrane, commander of the fleet, seemed to indicate a break between the two. High ranking officers were found guilty of plotting against the authority and the life of the Protector, and although an uprising was averted, San Martin's heart was lacerated by so much ingratitude and treachery.3" While the facade of military unity was cracking, the political scene was actually exploding with discord. San Martin began to doubt whether it was possible to "erigir estos paises en reptiblicas," as he stated in a confidential letter to O'Higgins. Since 1821, at least, San Martin had favored the creation of monarchies administered by European princes for the South American countries. His co-worker, Monteagudo, now founded the "Patriotic Society of Lima" as a means of "selling" this idea to the Peruvian people. It is very likely that San Martin thought this solution would serve a two-fold purpose: a ready acceptance by the aristocracy of Lima, and a step toward international recognition by the European powers. Diplomatic missions sailed for Europe, but neither did they accomplish their aim, nor did San 36 Leopold R. Ornstein, "La guerra terrestre y la acci6n continental de la revoluci6n argentina," Historia Thus, the meeting with Bolivar had gradually developed into an issue of the highest political significance. San Martin prepared for his conference with the Liberator by promising to summon a Peruvian congress which should decide the highly controversial question of governmental structure. He delegated his powers to the Marqu6s de Torre Tagle on January 19, 1822, and three weeks later he set sail for his meeting with Bolivar in Guayaquil. In the preamble of his decree announcing the change in government, he writes, ... la causa del continent americano ... exigio que me encargase del ejercicio de la autoridad suprema, y me someti con zelo a este convencimiento: hoy me llama a realizar un designio cuya contemplation alhaga (sic) mis mas caras esperanzas: voy a encontrar en Guayaquil al libertador de Colombia: los intereses generates de ambos estados, la energica terminacion de la guerra que sostenemos y la estabilidad del destiny a que con rapidez se acerca la America, hacen nuestra entrevista necesaria, ya que el orden de los acontecimientos nos ha constituido en alto grado responsables del exito de esta sublime empresa.A8 Specifically, these words meant that San Martin wanted (1) to discuss Guayaquil (los intereses generates del Peru y Colombia) (2) the war in Ecuador and Peru (la energica termination de la guerra) and (3) the problem of state government (la estabilidad del destiny). He saw himself and Bolivar as the arbiters of South America's destiny. These were the matters of greatest import to San Martin in February of 1822, and it is well to keep them in mind as we view his subsequent line of conduct. The letter of August, written only a month after the event in question, is undoubtedly the most important document from San Martin's side. The arguments brought against its authenticity are: (1) the original manuscript has not yet been found, (2) it was published twenty-two years after it was written, and (3) it has not been clearly established how Lafond came into possession of the letter, that is, whether he received it from one of Bolivar's aides or directly from San Martin.55 But this uncertainty does not seem in itself sufficient to discredit the letter. Similar charges can be preferred against many a famous South American document; take, for instance, Bolivar's "Carta de Jamaica." We are, therefore, obliged to submit the letter to further examination to determine its credibility, and it seems expedient at this point to present the document in full, in order that text and analysis may be clearly followed. inepto Torre Tagle, las atenciones que me rodeaban en aquel momento no me permitian escribirle con la extension que deseaba; ahora al verificarlo, no solo lo har6 con la franqueza de mi caracter, sino con la que exigen los grandes intereses de la America. Los resultados de nuestra entrevista no han sido los que me prometia para la pronta terminaci6n de la guerra. Desgraciadamente, yo estoy intimamente convencido, o que no ha credo sincero mi ofrecimiento de servir bajo sus ordenes con las fuerzas de mi mando, o que mi persona le es embarazosa. Las razones que usted me expuso, de que su delicadeza no le permitiria jams mandarme, y que, aun en el caso de que esta dificultad pudiese ser vencida, estaba seguro que el congreso de Colombia no consentiria su separaci6n de la Republica, permitame general le diga, no me han parecido plausibles. La primera se refuta por si misma. En cuanto a la segunda, estoy muy persuadido, que la menor manifestaci6n suya al congreso seria acogida con unanime aprobaci6n cuando se trata de finalizar la lucha en que estamos empefiados, con la cooperaci6n de usted y la del ej6rcito de su mando; y que el alto honor de ponerle t6rmino refluira tanto sobre usted como sobre la repuiblica que preside.
No se haga V. ilusi6n, general. Las noticias que tiene de las fuerzas realistas son equivocadas; ellas montan en el Alto y Bajo Peru a mas de 19,000 veteranos, que pueden reunirse en el espacio de dos meses. El ej6rcito patriota diezmado por las enfermedades, no podrA poner en linea de batalla sino 8,500 hombres, y de estos, una gran parte reclutas. La division del general Santa Cruz (cuyas bajas segun me escribe este general, no han sido reemplazadas, a pesar de sus reclamaciones) en su dilatada marcha por tierra, debe experimenter una p6rdida considerable, y nada podra emprender en la presente campana. La division de 1,400 colombianos que V. envia sera necesaria para mantener la guarnici6n del Callao, y el orden de Lima. Por consiguiente, sin el apoyo del ej6rcito de su mando, la operaci6n que se prepara por puertos intermedios no podra conseguir las ventajas que debian esperarse, si fuerzas poderosas no llamarin la atenci6n del enemigo por otra parte, y asi la lucha se prolongara por un tiempo indefinido. Digo indefinido porque estoy intimamente convencido, que sean cuales fueren las vicisitudes de la presente guerra, la independencia de la Am6rica es irrevocable; pero tambien lo estoy, de que su prolongaci6n causara la ruina de sus pueblos, y es un deber sagrado para los hombres a quienes estan confiados sus destinos, evitar la continuaci6n de tamafnos males.
En fin, general; mi partido esta irrevocablemente tomado. Para el 20 del mes entrante he convocado el primer congreso del Perd, y al dia siguiente de su instalaci6n me embarcar6 para Chile, convencido de que mi presencia es el solo obsticulo que le impide a usted venir al Perd con el eiercito de su mando. Para mf hubiese sido el colmo de la felici-dad, terminar la guerra de la independencia bajo las 6rdenes de un general a quien la America debe su libertad. El destino lo dispone de otro modo, y es preciso conformarse.
No dudando que despuds de mi salida del Peru, el gobierno que se establezea reclamara la activa cooperaci6n de Colombia, y que usted no podra negarse a tan justa exigencia, remitir6 a usted una nota de todos los jefes cuya conducta militar y privada puede ser a usted de alguna utilidad su conocimiento.
El general Arenales quedara encargado del mando de las fuerzas argentinas. Su honradez, coraje y conocimientos, estoy seguro lo harain acreedor a que usted le dispense toda consideraci6n. Nada dir6 a usted sobre la reunion de Guayaquil a la Republica de Colombia. Permitame, general, que le diga, que crel que no era a nosotros a quienes correspondia decidir este importante asunto. Concluida la guerra, los gobiernos respectivos lo hubieran transado, sin los inconvenientes que en el dia pueden resultar a los intereses de los nuevos estados de Sud-Am6rica.
He hablado a usted, general, con franqueza, pero los sentimientos que exprime esta carta, quedarain sepultados en el may's profundo silencio; si llegasen a traslucirse, los enemigos de nuestra libertad podrian prevalecerse para perjudicarla, y los intrigantes y ambiciosos para soplar la discordia.
Con el comandante Delgado, dador de 6sta, remito a usted una escopeta y un par de pistolas, juntamente con un caballo de paso que le ofreci en Guayaquil. Admita usted, general, esta memoria del primero de sus admiradores.
Con estos sentimientos, y con los de desearle dnicamente sea usted quien tenga la gloria de terminar la guerra de la independencia de la Am6rica del Sud, se repite su afectismo servidor. 
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When San Martin wrote to his Argentine and Chilean friends he felt obliged to explain how it was that he could consider resigning his power at the moment when the main endeavor of his life-the expulsion of the Spaniards-was still unfinished. It was only natural that he should attempt to convince them that the job was practically accomplished; all that remained was the execution of his instructions. It is for this reason that he writes to Rudecindo Alvarado, whom he appointed commander-in-chief," "Voy a embarcarme, usted queda para concluir la gran obra."62 But, in his heart of hearts, he was assailed by doubts which he could not reveal to his companions. To Bolivar he could, nay he must, speak in different vein. Since his letter was a last appeal to the Liberator to come to the help of Peru, he outlined the situation in sombre colors. colors which, however, proved true. He was not afraid of speaking his mind, because his words were absolutely confidential (los sentimientos que exprime esta carta, quedarnn sepultados en el mts profundo silencio) and would, he hoped, never reach the ears of his officers and undermine their confidence. , 1950) , p. 150. "Tales bajas fueron cubiertas en verdad con prisioneros realistas dos veces, pero como esta clase de soldados aprovecha la primera oportunidad para desertarse, es lo que sucedi6 en este caso en una gran proporci6n..... must, for the moment await the uncovering of additional factual detail. Our main consideration at this point is to note whether the whole fabric of the document is affected by a defection in one part. If the letter can be proven accurate in all other instances, it would seem only logical to withhold judgment on this item until further evidence is forthcoming.
The third and last point of contention also concerns the fate of the division Santa Cruz-". . . en su dilatada marcha por tierra, debe experimenter una p6rdida considerable, y nada podrA emprender en la presente campafra." Both Lecuna and Mendoza state flatly that San Martin would never have written such non3ense, since the division, as they maintain, did not return by land but by sea, convoyed by the Peruvian navy, and by August, 1822, was safely back in Lima."6 To prove their point they quote certain passages in Sucre's letters, which do indeed state that the division Santa Cruz was going on board the Peruvian warships in the last ten days of July.67
But the above argument suffers from a certain omission: the embarkation of the division at Guayaquil did not preclude an overland march to Lima. Let us look further into Bolivar's letters, letters which have been edited by Sefior Lecuna, and, we should suppose, closely scrutinized by Mendoza. It is difficult to comprehend how the following evidence could have been overlooked. In a letter of September 14, 1822, Bolivar writes to Santander: "Hoy he visto una carta del general Santa Cruz al coronet Heres en que te dice, desde Piura, que marchaba para Lima auntque con poco gusto sUyo."68 Here is incontrovertible proof, in Bolivar's own letters, that Santa Cruz had not returned to Lima in the first days of September. The significance of this fact is far-reaching. We must understand that Santa Cruz had led the division back to Piura, whence it had come originally to participate in Segun el convenio ajustado entre los coroneles Andr6s de Santa Cruz-por parte del Perui-y TomAs de Heres-por parte de Colombia-las tropas peruanas serfan pagadas con igual sueldo que 6l que percibfan en el Peru y que las bajas que sufriera la Divisi6n se reemplazarfan con soldados de Colombia (Paz SoldAn, p~ginas 249 y 250 del Tomo I de la Historia del Perd Independiente). Esta importantfsima clhusula no se cumpli6 y los reemplazossoldados realistas prisioneros-desertaron en una gran cantidad." This fact would certainly explain the contradiction between Santa Cruz' letter of May 28, and his alleged complaint to San Martin. 68 But let us read San Martin's report to General Miller, written on April 9, 1827, five years after the meeting. Encuanto a mi viaje a Guayaquil 61 no tuvo otro objeto que el de reclamar del General Bolivar los auxilios que pudiera prestar para terminar la guerra del Peru: auxilios que una justa retribuci6n (prescindiendo de los intereses generates de Am6rica) lo exigia por los que el Peru tan generosamente habla prestado para libertar el territorio de Colombia. Mi confianza en el buen resultado estaba tanto mas fundada cuanto el ejercito de Colombia despuies de la batalla de Pichincha se habia aumentado con los prisioneros, y contaba con 9.600 bayonetas; pero mis esperanzas fueron burladas al ver que en mi primer conferencia con el Libertador me declare que haciendo todos los esfuerzos posibles s6lo podia desprenderse de tres batallones con la fuerza total de 1.070 plazas. 80 Estos auxilios no me parecieron suficientes para terminar la guerra, piies estaba convencido que el buen 6xito de ella no podia esperarse sin la activa y eficaz cooperaci6n de todas las fuerzas de Colombia. 81 It is here that our sources evidence the greatest disparity. In his letter to Santander, Bolivar alludes solely to the auxiliary corps that Colombia was giving to San Martin (in recompense for the help received from the Santa Cruz division), stating that Peru would receive altogether 3,000 men, but he never mentions specifically San Martin's request that he should lead the whole Colombian army into Peru.82 San Martin's letters, on the other hand, make a point of the fact that these demands were unequivocal. Since this issue is the real crux of the matter, we must decide how to interpret the divergence. We venture to hazard a logical explanation of what probably happened. San Martin first asked Bolivar to make redress for the losses that his troops had sustained in Ecuador, and in addition requested an expedi-79 O'Leary, op. cit. (Narraci6n), II, 173. "En su entrevista con San Martin, pregunt6le el Libertador con empenio si no serfa preferable marchar al interior del Perd con today la fuerza disponible, a dividirla, y de ese modo exponer al ej6rcito a ser batido en detal, a lo que contest6 el Protector, objetando que las provincias independientes del Perd no tenfan los recursos suficientes para mover una gran fuerza a trav6s de Asi es que mi resolution fue tomada en el acto, creyendo de mi deber hacer el ultimo sacrificio en beneficio del Peru'. Al siguiente dia y a presencia del Vice-Almirante Blanco dije al Libertador que haviendo dejado convocado al Congreso para el pr6ximo mes-el dia de su instalacion seria el Altimo de mi permanencia en el Perd, afiadiendoAhora le queda a Vd. general un nuevo campo de gloria en el que va Vd. a poner el filtimo sello a la libertad de la America. Yo autorizo y ruego a Vd. escriba al general Blanco-a fin de rectificar este hecho.86
Realization was bitter for San Martin, and he controlled himself with difficulty during the first moments, but on the following day he was calm enough to tell Bolivar of his decision to leave Peru and to invite the Liberator to take over. For the second time, however, San Martin had misjudged Bolivar's intentions. It is all too true that the Liberator was egotistical and selfish; if he could be jealous of Sucre, he must have sensed a far more dangerous rival in San Martin. 87 But his desire for fame was not his sole motive. We know that Bolivar had serious misgivings in regard to San Martin's plan of campaign, and the Liberator must have entertained grave doubts as to whether San Martin could ever bring himself to accept the judgments of a younger man. Moreover, there was the army itself to consider; even if the older and more professional officer had been willing to subject himself to the instructions of the younger, would his army be willing to go along with him? Bolivar must have felt that in every crisis he would be in danger of an uprising of the ArgentinePeruvian army under the command of San Martin. A subordinate position under Bolivar's command was both illogical and impossible, but the Liberator could not make this fact clear to San Martin in so many words, and he felt obliged to be evasive and to say that his delicacy forbade that he should command the Protector. 88 In his reports to the Colombian government Bolivar omits any reference to San Martin's offer, but in his private letter to Santander he writes, "No hay genero de amistad ni de oferta que no me haya hecho."89 86 See note 51 supra. See also the letter of Sept. 11, 1848 to Ram6n Castilla. "Yo hubiera tenido la m?s completa satisfacci6n habiendole puesto fin con la terminaci6n de la guerra de la Independencia en el Perd, pero mi entrevista en Guayaquil con el general Bolivar me convenci6, no obstante sus promesas, que el s6lo obst?culo de su venida al Peru con el ejercito de su mando, no era otro que la presencia del general San Martin, a pesar de la sinceridad con que le ofrecf ponerme a sus ordenes, con todas las fuerzas de que yo disponfa." (Rojas, op. cit., p. 632 
During their second conference on the following day, San Martin, drawing his conclusions from the previous meeting, told Bolivar that he had determined to resign. He spoke of the burden of responsibility he carried, and, most bitterly, about his Argentine companions-in-arms who had betrayed him in Lima. He even said that he had left his resignation of the protectorate in a sealed envelope in Lima, that he would give up his military power as soon as the first victory had been achieved, and that he would go to Mendoza to live in retirement. 90 He added, however, that before taking these final steps, he wished to make sure that the foundations of government were well established. He reiterated his belief that Peru's political problems could be solved only by summoning a European prince to assume the powers of state. It would seem that the discussion became more violent at this point. Bolivar was a republican and had many reasons to fear monarchic experiments, and he said frankly that he would not tolerate a monarchy, neither in Colombia nor in America.4 He declared that he would fight it if he could. He thought, however, that each state should be free to choose its own government, and he alluded to his political ideas as expressed in the famous "discurso de Angostura." San Martin did not wish to press the point and remarked that the importation of foreign princes could be left to the future. But Bolivar was unwilling to compromise, and declared that such a plan would be out of question at any time, that he, Bolivar, would prefer the Iturbides e tutti quanta to be crowned as kings rather than allow Bourbons or Hapsburgs to set foot on American soil. 91 Here again our source material shows divergencies. San Martin's later letters do not mention this part of his discussion with Bolivar, and certain historians, like Rojas, for example, adopt the conclusion from this fact that San Martin merely used his ideas on American monarchies as a diplomatic ruse.92 I cannot accept the Rojas viewpoint since all of Bolivar's letters show that San Martin's monarchical plans had moved him to a profound degree. Once again we are obliged to realize that each of these men recollected the events of Guayaquil in the light of his own ideas. Hence their reports are disparate, and it is the duty of the historian to select the evidence that seems most valid.
Whatever San Martin's proposal may have been, Bolivar suspected that the Argentine himself had designs on the crown. He confessed to his friends that the Liberator was not the man they had imagined him to be,-"el general Bolivar nos gan6 de mano."100 He found in Bolivar an extraordinary superficiality, an inconsistency in principle, and a puerile vanity. He believed him to be a man in whom the will to power was a controlling passion.10l He even thought Bolivar capable of invading Peru if such an action would add to his fame. "He comprendido su desabrimiento por la gloria que pudiera caberme en la prosecuci6n de la presente campafia. El no excusara medios, por audaces que fuesen, para penetrar a esta republican, seguido de sus tropas."'02 222 THE HISPANIC AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW nota, siempre que el Gobierno del Peru' tenga a bien aceptar la oferta de este nuevo refuerzo; el que no marcha inmediatamente porque no estaba preparado, y porque tampoco se ha pedido por parte de S.E. el Protector. Si el Gobierno del Peru determine recibir los 4.000 hombres de Colombia, espera el Libertador que vengan transportes y viveres para llevarlos, anticipando el aviso para que todos los cuerpos se encuentren en Guayaquil oportunamente.
En el caso de remitirse al Peru' esa fuerza, el Libertador desearia que la campafia del Peru se dirigiese de un modo que no fuese decisivo y se esperase la llegada de los nuevos cuerpos de Colombia para obrar inmediatamente y con la actividad mas completa, luego que estuviesen incorporados al Ejercito aliado. S.E. no se atreve a insistir mucho sobre esta medida, porque no conoce la situacion del momento; pero desea ardientemente que la vida politica del Peru no sea comprometida sino con una plena y absoluta confianza en el suceso. El amor a la causa de America le ha dictado estos sentimientos, que no ha podido reprimir y que se ha credo obligado a comunicar a ese gobierno.113
Here Bolivar proposes not only to send 4,000 men to Perutroops which he insists have not been requested by San Martinbut he advises the Peruvian government to ask for further support from Chile and Argentina, and even sketches a new line of military conduct in case San Martin's strategic plans should end in failure.
What explanation can there be for so radical a change in his appraisal of the Peruvian situation? In his letters Bolivar states that Colonel Heres had brought him alarming news.114 But such information would hardly have moved him to make this startling offer. Whether Bolivar had received San Martin's message of August 29 by September 9, or whether he simply acted under the assumption that San Martin would sooner or later remove himself cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty."1' It is significant, however, that Bolivar's message of September 9 seems to take it for granted that San Martin is no longer in the running. It will be noted that the offer is directed to the Peruvian foreign minister, and not to San Martin. If the Liberator thought that San Martin could still wield any influence in governmental decisions in Peru it would seem very strange that Bolivar should overlook him in a matter of such magnitude. Not only would it be an act of gross discourtesy to one who had, only six weeks previously, paid him an official visit, but it would come very close to a confession of their basically disparate viewpoints. In fine, we must assume that Bolivar knew when he sent his offer to the Peruvian government that San Martin's departure from Lima was imminent.
The four thousand men offered by Bolivar were not at his disposal at the time his secretary transcribed this remarkable document. He had hopes of receiving reinforcements from northern Colombia which could be passed on to Peru. He also foresaw the necessity of appealing to Peru's southern neighbors, as San Martin had earlier in the year. So far the document seems to be the logical consequence of the events as analyzed above. There is, however, one reference in the letter of September 9 which calls for further explanation. Bolivar states explicitly that the Protector had not asked for help. Now since the document was published in a Buenos Aires newspaper while San Martin was still on Argentine soil, why did he not protest against such a distortion of historical truth?116 Lecuna and Mendoza respond to this question by saying that he did not make any attempt to refute Bolivar because Bolivar was telling the truth."17 We, on the other hand, believe that San Martin's silence was merely a part of his conduct of resignation and sacrifice for the good of the American cause.
Only after the lapse of more than twenty years was San Martin willing to break the silence which had until then clouded the part assigned to him in the momentous drama which led to his departure from America and eventually to Bolivar's final victory in Peru. San Martin himself said that America owed him a debt of gratitude not only for his self-effacing attitude, but for the complete silence he had preserved about his decision and the circumstances which had motivated him. "Si algu'n servicio tiene que agradecerme la America, es el de mi retirada de Lima, paso que no solo comprometia mi honor y reputaci6n, sino que era tanto mas sensible, cuanto que conocia que, con las fuerzas reunidas de Colombia, la guerra de la Independencia hubiera sido terminada en todo el afio 23. Pero este costoso sacrificio y el no pequefo de tener que guardar un silencio absoluto (tan necesario en aquellas circunstancias) por los motivos que me obligaron a dar este paso, son esfuerzos que usted podra calcular y que no esta al alcance de todos el poder apreciarlos."ll8 San Martin had come to the meeting with three basic interests the importance of which he graded in this order: 1) a solution for the problem of Guayaquil; 2) the possible establishment of monarchies in the newly liberated countries as the most promising answer to the many unsolved problems that endangered the peaceful development of the Latin-American nations; and 3) the assurance of assistance from the Colombian army which might lead eventually to a union of the Peruvian-Argentine and the Colombian forces.127 As we have noted, however, the situation gave him no opportunity to discuss these matters freely. The question of Guayaquil had already found its solution, little as San Martin might approve of it; his monarchic designs met with un-mitigated opposition from Bolivar; his request for aid was only partly answered, while the idea of uniting the two armies was completely disregarded by Bolivar.128
In our opinion, both men displayed their true characters, and they reacted as their respective circumstances prompted them. It is quite true, as Lecuna has noted, that San Martin could still have persisted in his original mission to liberate Peru.129 Although the help offered by Bolivar was less than he had hoped for, it was by no means negligible. However, in order to carry out his plans, he would have been obliged to apply severe and even terroristic measures, and his nature did not allow him to consider such procedures. He said as much to Guido in the following words: "Tenga Ud. por cierto que por muchos motives no puedo ya mantenerme en mi puesto, sino bajo condiciones decididamente contraries a mis sentimentos y a mis convicciones mds firmes. Voy a decirlo: una de ellas es la inexcusable necesidad a que me han estrechado, si he de sostener el honor del ej6rcito y su disciplina, de fusilar algunos jefes; y me falta el valor para hacerlo con compafieros que me han seguido en los dias pr6speros y adversos." 130
In 1813, 1814, and 1817, in similar circumstances, Bolivar had shown the uncompromising and inexorable quality of his will, just as he was again to display it in 1824, when he finally shouldered the full responsibility for the independence of Peru. But San Martin was not the man for la guerra a muerte; he would never have executed a man like Piar, nor could he have tamed a lion like Paez. San Martin had faced the possibility of failure even before he had set sail for Guayaquil, and with this contingency in mind had prepared his resignation in case his meeting with Bolivar should prove to be an affaire flambee. In the face of Bolivar's refusal, San Martin felt unequal to the supreme effort of finishing the task on his own. He believed Bolivar possessed of a ruthless desire for power and glory which would recognize no block, not even that of civil war between the forces of the independence movement, and he decided to remove his person from the political and military scene, leaving to Bolivar a new field of glory. The complete silence in which he wrapped himself concerning the motives and circumstances of his decision was entirely characteristic. That he overrated Bolivar's military
